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The Antitrust Impact of Venture Capital 




University of California Hastings, College of the Law 





Technology plays a significant and crucial role in the current global 
economy. It impacts consumer welfare, the job market, economic progress, 
and the emergence of innovative technology. Due to the fact that the 
technology sector provides necessary and critical services, technology 
companies exercise immense power over consumers who rely on their 
products. The rising concentration in the technology sector magnifies the 
potential anticompetitive forces at play.  This article argues that venture 
capital financing leads to anticompetitive effects in the technology industry. 
Although most startups intend to eventually go public through an initial 
public offering (“IPO”), the liquidity pressures from venture capital firms 
positions startups for an acquisition. Under these circumstances, venture 
capital policies create economic opportunities for tech giants to swoop in and 
acquire startups. This escalation in M&A activity in the technology space 
increases the market power of tech giants such as Google, Facebook, and 
Amazon. The result is a highly concentrated technology market which stunts 





The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that venture capitalist’s 
behavior gives rise to anticompetitive conduct in tech because it enhances 
the dominance of tech giants through M&A. This Note has three major parts: 
Part 1 explains how VCs induce startups to sell, Part 2 describes the legal 
framework for antitrust and bridges the connection between VCs and M&A 
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activity, and Part 3 outlines a remedy for strengthening merger enforcement 
and potentially altering VC behavior towards startups in the tech industry.  
Technology startups increasingly view themselves as auditioning for 
sales to technology giants rather than creating long-term viable businesses. 
Corporate consolidation in tech deals is changing the startup ecosystem.  
Apple acquired Beats by Dre for $3 billion, Cisco bought AppDynamics at 
$3.7 billion a day before it was set to go public, Amazon purchased Whole 
Foods for $13.7 billion, and Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram amounted 
to $1 billion while its acquisition of WhatsApp totaled $22 billion.1 IBM 
topped this all off with the largest software M&A through its acquisition of 
Red Hat for $34 billion. These MegaTech deals indicate that lucrative 
acquisitions are becoming a more typical occurrence in the startup 
ecosystem.2  
For technology giants, these sorts of acquisitions of early stage firms 
serve the dual purposes of growth and disabling potential competitors. For 
instance, Applied Insight, an AI company, grew its revenue to $140 million 
and expanded to 500 employees through the acquisition of Applied 
Technology Group.3 Similarly, Aquicore, a commercial real estate software 
developer, acquired Entic.4 With this acquisition, Aquicore has been able to 
expand to Florida, Massachusetts, and California and grow its team by an 
additional 65 employees.5  
Federal regulators are beginning to examine the anti-competitive 
aspects of these types of deals, but it is not obvious that current antitrust law 
has much to say about them even though they threaten to concentrate 
consumer data in a relatively small number of hands.  The FTC has noted 
that it is time to “closely examine technology markets to ensure consumers 
benefit from free and fair competition.”6 However, mergers are not 
inherently harmful or anticompetitive and simply possessing monopoly 
 
 1. Todd Campbell, 9 Near Monopolies That Are Legal in America, THE MOTLEY FOOL 
(July 3, 2018), https://www.fool.com/slideshow/9-near-monopolies-are-legal-america/. 
 2. Alastair Rimmer, Tech Deals Bring New Challenges to M&A, STRATEGY+BUSINESS 
(May 16, 2018), https://www.strategy-business.com/article/Tech-Deals-Bring-New-Challen 
ges-to-M-A. 
 3. Michelai Graham, M&A Moves: These 3 DC-area Companies are Growing Via 
Acquisition, TECHNICAL.LY (Mar. 27, 2019, 12:44 PM), https://technical.ly/dc/2019/03/27/ 
these-3-dc-area-companies-are-growing-via-acquisition.  
 4. Id. 
 5. Graham, supra note 3. 
 6. FTC’s Bureau of Competition Launches Task Force to Monitor Technology Markets, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/ 
02/ftcs-bureau-competition-launches-task-force-monitor-technology. 
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power is not sufficient to establish a violation of antitrust laws.7 Moreover, 
antitrust analysis is a fact-intensive inquiry driven by the mechanics and 
market structure of the particular industry.8 Congress intended mergers to be 
viewed in light of industry qualities such as trends towards domination by a 
few leaders, barriers of entry to new companies, and access to the market.9  
Here, the tech industry is becoming increasingly consolidated and controlled 
by a few key players.10 Thus, antitrust should look beyond relevant market 
share data because the large tech companies’ strength lies in the way they 
leverage consumer data to gain power and eliminate competition.  
 
Part 1.  The Role of VCs in the Startup Ecosystem 
 
The evolution of the technology sector began in the Silicon Valley in 
the 1970s of Silicon Valley and was accompanied by the development of a 
new type of financing provided by a new type of institutional investor: 
venture capitalists.11 Venture capital funding significantly contributed to 
funding and building Apple, eBay, Yahoo, Google, and Facebook. Because 
banks were more risk averse than venture capitalists, startups relied on 
venture capital funding. As a result, it accelerated innovation and 
technological progress in Silicon Valley and the tech market.12 Corporate 
governance presents a fitting environment to unveil the ways in which 
different startup players’ conflicting interests affect exit strategy, the power 
that VCs yield over startups, and how VCs use that power to induce startups 
to sell.  
As an asset class, venture capital has evolved to what is described as 
high-risk private investment, usually in the form of a type of equity, in 
young, putatively high-growth businesses.13 VCs provide substantial funds, 
 
 7. Verizon Comm., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 
(2004). 
 8. Id. at 411. 
 9. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1962). 
 10. America’s Concentration Crisis, OPEN MARKETS INST. (June 2019), https://concen 
trationcrisis.openmarketsinstitute.org.  
 11. Team Wall Street Survivor, The History of Silicon Valley: Start-ups and Their 
Forefathers, WALL STREET SURVIVOR (Feb. 22, 2017), https://blog.wallstreetsurvivor.com/ 
2017/02/22/history-of-silicon-valley.  
 12. Starting Up: Silicon Valley’s Origins, NPR (Apr. 5, 2012, 3:20 AM), https://www. 
npr.org/transcripts/149992521?storyId=149992521. 
 13. What is Venture Capital? THE LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/ 
venture-capital. 
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as well as managerial and technical expertise for emerging companies.14 
Although these deals are very risky for investors, there is a strong potential 
for high returns. Over the years, VCs have become a fundamental part of the 
startup ecosystem and a major source for startups to raise capital. VC funding 
is more widely available than other funding like private equity or bank loans 
which is crucial to startups attempting to begin or grow their businesses. In 
spite of its pivotal role in the accelerated growth of Silicon Valley and 
technological innovation, other challenges have arisen.   
The provision of access to capital comes at the cost of startup founders 
losing equity in the company and the loss of independence.15 The loss of 
equity by founders occurs because venture capital funds are bound by duties 
to their limited partners. Money invested in the fund is used to buy shares in 
high risk high reward startups which the VC firms hope will turn a 
substantial profit.16 Because of the high-risk nature of the investment, VC 
firms gain ownership and agency in the business decisions of startups. This 
allows them to ensure the security of their investments by actively providing 
guidance and often requesting board positions. Thus, with the gradual influx 
of capital, founders lose equity and decision-making power in the future of 
the startup at each stage of the financing.  
There are three main pathways to liquidate VC investment and reap the 
gains: 1) by IPO, 2) acquisition or 3) dissolution. Not only has the IPO 
market weakened, but regulatory measures like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 make IPOs more costly for emerging companies in the startup tech 
space. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes heightened compliance 
requirements which influence startups to abstain from going public. With the 
weakening of the IPO market, and dissolution truly an unsavory and unviable 
option, mergers have become the preferred liquidation event.  
VCs cultivate incredible influence over a startup through ownership and 
board representation. As preferred stock shareholders, the VCs interests are 
protected through contractual rights requiring their approval for certain 
transactions. This gives them privileges over the common-stockholders and 
opportunities to appoint VC-approved board members.  The cash flow rights 
of preferred stock incentivize VCs to concentrate more on liquidation in the 
 
 14. James Chen, Venture Capital, Investopedia (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.investo 
pedia.com/terms/v/venturecapital.asp. 
 15. What is VC Funding? Everything You Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL, https://www.up 
counsel.com/what-is-vc-funding.  
 16. Gary J. Ross, How Venture Capital Funds Work, ABOVE THE LAW (June 15, 2017, 
3:03 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/06/how-venture-capital-funds-work/?rf=1. 
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short term rather than the sustainability of the company in the long run.17 
Preferred stockholders can even invest in future financing rounds, giving 
them more authority and ownership in the company.18   
Staged investments affect the balance of power in the early stage of 
venture-backed startups. Typically, venture capitalists acquire majority votes 
and protection rights through each round of financing.19 VCs are able to 
acquire such power by leveraging the startup entrepreneurial team’s need for 
additional financing because initial investments are often not enough to 
jumpstart the business and fully develop the idea or product.20 As a result, 
the startup founders dilute their ownership rights in subsequent early stages 
of funding.21 To illustrate the evolution of emerging startups, the pattern of 
shifting control from founders to investors happens within the first few 
rounds of venture financing.22 Startup entrepreneurs play easily into the 
hands of VCs and inadvertently surrender control because they are motivated 
to complete their innovative project, and they fear that without VC funding, 
the startup will fail. The future of the startups depends upon the VC’s 
decision to either continue to fund the project, and in the process gain more 
power in the company, or to abandon the startup altogether.23 Staged 
investments formally and informally function to make startups and their 
founders ultimately comply with exit strategies favorable to VC interests. 
This occurs because venture capital has limited partnerships to whom they 
owe a fiduciary duty to vest the money, usually in ten-year term investments. 
This informs VCs interest in desiring to liquidate the fund’s portfolio as soon 
as possible.24 Therefore, each round of staged financing enables VCs to 
accumulate significant authority within the startups to drive it towards an 
M&A exit.  
VCs attempt to gain a foothold in startup boards in order to control key 
strategic decisions and dictate the future of the company. Startup boards 
 
 17. Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in 
Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 987–88 (2006). 
 18. Venture Capital Definitions: Common v. Preferred Shares, ALACRITY CANADA 
(Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.alacritycanada.com/2016/08/04/venture-capital-definitions-com 
mon-v-preferred-shares/. 
 19. D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 323–
24 (2005). 
 20. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering A Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the 
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1072–75 (2003). 
 21. Supra note 19, 323–24. 
 22. Elizabeth Pullman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 181(2019). 
 23. Supra note 20, 1072–75. 
 24. Id. at 1072–75. 
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function uniquely in that the board members heavily participate in the 
decision-making process and actively engage in the operation of the 
startup.25 As VCs gain control over the board through each round of 
financing, VCs attain power and influence to make key critical decisions in 
how to allocate their investment and dictate the startups’ growth goals.  
Specifically, VCs obtain the ability to block unfavorable transactions, and to 
initiate and influence the acquisition route as a means of liquidation.26 In 
addition, studies show that in VC backed startups one-fifth of the startup 
founders are replaced.27 Moreover, swing votes in VC supported startups are 
held by independent directors, chosen by both the VCs and common 
stockholders.28 These board members interests may align with the VCs, 
thereby granting significant autonomy and power to VCs to push for 
liquidation and mergers, as opposed to allowing a startup to operate 
independently and grow sustainably. In essence, startup boards serve as an 
illustration of the way in which VCs ensure that their interests in being 
acquired prevail over the interests of startup entrepreneurs.  
Corporate governance issues arising from VC-backed startups create 
legal and economic scandals such that an M&A exit strategy becomes 
preferable.29 VC-backed startups are pressured to scale quickly due to the 
grow-at-all costs mentality fostered by VC funds. Since the structure of 
staged financing does not provide sufficient time to raise revenue, valuations 
rely on factors like: the portfolio of the entrepreneur, size of the market 
opportunity, traction, progress towards a minimally viable product, capital 
efficiency, and whether the company is hot.30 Also, each startup valuation 
across Series-A, B, C, D, E funding is unique and assessed differently. Due 
to the complexity and difficulty in ascertaining the valuation of a startup, 
such valuations are considered to be a black box.31 Thus, valuations largely 
depict an inaccurate snapshot of a startups true worth. This form of 
 
 25. Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in 
Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 987–88 (2006). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Michael Ewens & Matt Marx, Research: What Happens to a Startup When Venture 
Capitalists Replace the Founder, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (Feb. 14, 2018), https://hbr. 
org/2018/02/research-what-happens-to-a-startup-when-venture-capitalists-replace-the-founder. 
 28. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, supra note 25 at 987–988. 
 29. Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 181(2019). 
 30. Mike Sullivan & Richard D. Harroch, A Guide to Venture Capital Financings for 
Startups, FORBES (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2018/03/29/a-
guide-to-venture-capital-financings-for-startups/#15f9a77e51c9. 
 31. Will Gornall & Ilya Strebulaev, Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with Reality, 
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, forthcoming (Dec. 2, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2955455. 
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information asymmetry can manifest itself as a culture of quick, 
unsustainable growth at the cost of compliance and good corporate 
governance. VCs encourage (or rather demand) accelerated growth as a 
means of staying afloat and gaining more funding.32 Founders use traction 
and “fake it until you make it growth” to become a hot topic and increase 
their valuation profile. Doing so plants the seed of corporate governance 
dysfunction which inhibits founders from continuing to grow their company 
privately and independently. It can also burden startups to the point where 
IPO compliance costs are too heavy to bear. And even if attempts at scaling 
the company in the name of growth do not kill the company, it can result in 
harmful corporate scandals.33 Some of the major examples of startup 
governance failures include: Zenefit, SoFi, Theranos, Uber, WrkRiot, 
Skully, and Hampton Creek.  
Although the structure of VC-backed startups provides VCs the ability 
to facilitate startup maturity through monitoring, internal controls, and 
screening processes, it is not enough. Simply acquiring more control and 
ownership over startups does not prevent startups from being embroiled in 
massive corporate scandals. For example, Zenefits’ employees were found 
to be cheating on their insurance state brokerage exams. Zenefits is an online 
software system automating health insurance and other essential office 
services. Their product promised to streamline and reduce HR costs for 
business around America.34 Initially, it appeared that Zenefits was the ideal 
startup with a visionary founder, tapping into the health software space while 
bringing in revenue through insurance brokerage commissions.35 In three 
years, Zenefits expanded from fifteen employees to 1600 employees.36 
However, this growth did not occur naturally, but from pressure to keep 
expanding and moving faster. Zenefits soon realized that its place in the 
market was not as secure as it believed because certain states banned the 
product and other companies did not have the technological capacity to 
 
 32. Luke Kanies, If You Take Venture Capital, You’re Forcing Your Company to Exit, 
MEDIUM (Nov. 9, 2017), https://medium.com/s/understanding-venture-capital/if-you-take-
venture-capital-youre-forcing-your-company-to-exit-fc08fcdb32cc. 
 33. Renata Quintini, Growth at All Costs? It’s Gonna’ Cost You, MEDIUM (Apr. 10, 
2018), https://medium.com/@renata.quintini/growth-at-all-costs-its-gonna-cost-you-821eb7 
9c7f2f. 
 34. Claire Suddath & Eric Newcomer, Zenefits Was the Perfect Startup. Then It Self-
Disrupted, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK (May 9, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
features/2016-zenefits/. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id.  
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accommodate Zenefits’ services.37 Minimal diligence and screening led to 
errors in insurance claims.38 On the operational level, there was no office 
manager to address site issues.39 The founder was adamant in closely 
managing HR decisions of Zenefits’ employees, a responsibility that should 
have been deferred to the HR team in Zenefits. In addition to this internal 
dysfunction, Zenefit’s insurance brokers were not properly licensed in their 
respective states to sell or advise people on insurance plans.40 Since each 
state had different insurance brokerage exams, and training requirements, it 
would be costly to sell Zenefits products across the country.41 To cut costs 
and bypass this licensing requirement, Zenefits created a Google Chrome 
browser extension that made it seem as if Zenefits’ employees were working 
on the course when they were not.42 Some Zenefit brokers did not even pass 
these tests.43 There was no system in place to track which employees had 
licenses or reciprocal licenses.44 The Zenefits case illustrates that such rapid 
growth may be dangerous and unsustainable as it leads to corporate 
governance failures. And, it shows that startups face unpredictable 
challenges in building a sustainable business which should trigger scrutiny 
and wariness of overly optimistic valuations.45 
Another key example is Hampton Creek Foods, a Silicon Valley startup 
producing plant-based food. It was a hot company with lots of traction and 
products aimed at disrupting the biotech market.46 However, Hampton Creek 
fell short of its promises and produced a number of corporate governance 
failures. The startup overhyped its capabilities to investors and the market 
by promising to deliver an impossible 43 new products.47 One of these 
products, a cake mix, was proposed to garner the interest of a Walmart buyer. 
 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id.  
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id.  
 45. Eric Newcomer, Predicting the Future Is Hard, Especially at a Startup. Just Ask 
Zenefits, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-19/predicting-
the-future-is-hard-especially-at-a-startup-just-ask-zenefits (last visited Apr. 4, 2020). 
 46. Helen Holmes, Is This Embattled Start-Up the Theranos of Mayonnaise?, OBSERVER, 
(Feb. 21, 2019, 1:03 PM), https://observer.com/2019/02/just-inc-mayonnaise-controversies-
theranos-comparison/. 
 47. Monica Watrous, What Happened To Hampton Creek?, FOOD BUSINESS NEWS (Apr. 
4, 2018), https://www.foodbusinessnews.net/articles/11575-what-happened-to-hampton-creek. 
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The startup has since scaled back to more realistic product launch goals.48 
Additionally, the startup was accused of artificially boosting sales of its 
products by having employees buy its plant-based products from stores. 
Moreover, Target removed Hampton Creek’s products from its stores after 
allegations of food safety concerns. Employees anonymously tried to inform 
the startup about the inaccurate nutritional and health claims, and the 
misrepresentation of scientific research regarding its plant-based food 
products.49 Also, the company’s board of directors all stepped down. 
Because of these scandals, the company tried to rebrand itself as Just Inc.50 
This case study demonstrates that rapid growth as a measure of viability puts 
immense pressure on startups to rely upon exaggerated claims and 
generating popularity as a means of maintaining VC support. In the process, 
startups end up forsaking quality control, compliance, and best business 
practices to satisfy VC interests. 
Uber, another VC backed startup, engaged in an endless stream of 
harmful corporate behavior. Aside from numerous rape and sexual 
harassment rumors, Uber’s major corporate governance issues lie in their 
questionable business practices. In August 2014, Uber attempted to 
undermine its competitor Lyft by hiring independent contractors with burner 
phones and credit cards to book thousands of fake rides.51 Uber repeated this 
behavior with a competitor in New York City, Gett Ride. In New York City, 
Uber’s contractors posed as pedestrians in order to poach drivers and cancel 
scheduled rides. This type of spamming negatively impacts the competitors’ 
revenue by wasting their drivers’ time and spiking up the ride prices. 
Furthermore, Uber misrepresented information about drivers’ potential 
earnings which eventually led to a $20-million settlement with the FTC. To 
circumvent cities’ local laws and regulations, Uber used Greyball to identify 
and avoid sting operations where they committed violations. Uber also used 
another tool called God View, which allowed them to track cars and gain 
access to the personal information of drivers in the car. The use of this tool 
was problematic because there was a lack of data and security protocols in 
place. Thus, even after a huge data breach occurred, Uber was unable to 
disclose and remedy the breach in a timely manner. Uber’s case illustrates 
that VC investment, and the desire to raise capital is not always aligned with 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Ian Agar, Just Inc. Raising $200M Amid Controversial Past, PITCHBOOK (Feb. 20, 
2019), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/just-inc-raising-200-million-amid-controversial-past. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Sam Levin, Uber's Scandals, Blunders and PR disasters: The Full List, GUARDIAN 
(June 27, 2019, 19,14 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/18/uber-
travis-kalanick-scandal-pr-disaster-timeline. 
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transparency and accountability. As long as a company is growing, and more 
capital can be raised, VCs are content. With that being said, not every startup 
will become a unicorn or become as large as Uber. This spells disaster for a 
lot of young, emerging startups whose revenue stream cannot be realized as 
easily or quickly as Uber’s ride hailing service was. Early stage innovative 
startups take much longer than Uber to amass a stable revenue stream. 
Consequently, startups will be induced to sell because it is unlikely that they 
will achieve unicorn status or be highly profitable within the timeframe that 
suits VC interests. In the process of pursuing exponential growth and unicorn 
status, startups do not focus on compliance which can become costly and 
burdensome to remedy as the startup expands. Uber is not the norm and 
although they may have the capital to deal with compliance issues, many 
startups will not have the same luxury which leaves them in a 
disadvantageous position. Overall, this makes acquisitions far more 
attractive and practical than IPOs for VCs and young startups. 
The fact that VCs have been the strongest drivers of technological 
innovation and growth in the startup ecosystem makes them an influential 
part of startup culture. With the influx of VC capital flooding the startup 
ecosystem, startups are pressured to “go big or go home.” Not only that, but 
startup entrepreneurs have risen to celebrity status and resort to exaggerating 
their successes in order to garner more attention and more VC capital. 
Theranos is a prime example of how a founder, enamored by VC investment 
and the prospect of rapid growth, promised products that they were 
ultimately unable to deliver upon. Theranos claimed that they created a 
miniaturized blood analyzer that would transform the blood testing industry. 
However, Theranos’ scientific claims were neither tested nor verified. The 
medical product did not function properly. Theranos’ founder, Elizabeth 
Holmes, rose to prominence quickly, gaining fame and media attention. 
Internally, Theranos was different. The corporate culture did not value 
transparency or compliance, and instilled fear and secrecy. Theranos did not 
heed customer complaints about the flawed inaccurate blood test results. 
Moreover, employees who spoke up about questionable ethical practices 
were ignored and often fired. Theranos’s founder grossly misrepresented the 
success of the product, resorting to hyping itself up, in order to continue to 
receive support and funding from investors. No one was willing to question 
Theranos’ product; not even Walgreens, which spent millions of dollars to 
work with Theranos.52 The power of the entrepreneurial celebrity status is so 
compelling that it can persuade companies like Walgreens to forego due 
 
 52. Rashmi Airan, Theranos Scandal Highlights Need for Effective Corporate 
Governance, Rashmi (June 8, 2018), https://www.rashmiairan.com/theranos-scandal-highli 
ghts-need-for-effective-corporate-governance/. 
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diligence just to have access to a popular technology.53 Fear of disappointing 
the investors, not developing the product fully, and focusing on what the 
product could be instead of what it was caused it to fail.54   
Although Theranos is an extreme example, there are many startups like 
Theranos in their initial stages, who possess strong talent, solid ideas, and a 
thriving business. To grow, they resort to exaggerations about their products, 
hype themselves up and rely on bad business practices to gain ludicrously 
high inaccurate valuations. As these fledgling startups continue to grow, 
these bad business practices become ingrained in their corporate culture. 
This type of growth coupled with more capital than a startup needs can lead 
startups to grow their businesses to scale with only short-term goals in mind, 
ending in burnout. For example, Homejoy, an on-demand home cleaning 
services platform, completed a $38 million round of financing in a little over 
a year.55 However, two years later in 2015, it shut down due to its failing 
growth strategy. Rather than focusing on user retention of its services, 
Homejoy was focused on customer acquisition since VCs cared about rapid 
growth.56 And rapid growth for platform companies means gaining a larger 
number of customers. Homejoy relied heavily on discounting their cleaning 
services as a means of getting more customers.57 But this strategy was very 
costly and came at the expense of little revenue and minimal customer 
retention. Homejoy also was unable to create a consistent high-quality 
service and was burdened by lawsuits due to compliance issues regarding 
worker classification.58 Before it could be acquired, Google poached the 
engineers and talent team. Thus, in the long term, bad corporate governance 
inhibits startups’ ability to achieve good quality growth.  With such high 
valuations, a volatile market, and the burden of compliance, companies are 
positioned for an M&A or dissolution. And before dissolution can occur, as 
it did for Homejoy, VCs pressure startups to sell while their products have 
not yet been duplicated by tech giants and they are still “hot” on the tech 
scene.  
To pursue this point further, even when companies are on a strong track, 
VCs pressure for exit through an acquisition as seen in the case of harmon.ie, 
 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Alex Moazed, How to Avoid Crashing and Burning Like This $150 Million 
Company, INC.COM (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.inc.com/alex-moazed/3-tips-to-avoid-
crashing-and-burning-a-150-million-startup.html. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Christina Farr, Why Homejoy Failed, WIRED (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.wired. 
com/2015/10/why-homejoy-failed/. 
 58. Id. 
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a software tech startup creating collaboration tools.59 At the end of the VCs 
seven-year investment cycle, the VC expected harmon.ei to sell in order to 
return profit to their limit-partner investors. The co-founder and CEO pushed 
back against an exit, believing it to be premature and not in line with the 
interests of the startup in the long term.60 The VCs interest in selling is driven 
by their fiduciary duties to their investors and tied to the lifecycle of the 
investment. Thus, the priority is often VC profit and interests, rather than 
innovation, quality of the product, sustainability of the business, and 
customer welfare.61 In response to this demand, harmon.ie turned to banks 
for loans to buy out the VC shares and gain their independence. This case 
illustrates VCs obsession with an exit, driven by the lifecycle of their 
investment, and their fiduciary duties to their limited partners.  
 
Part 2.  Legal Framework 
 
Antitrust law is intended to protect consumer welfare and promote 
healthy vigorous competition. It serves as a check against companies who 
have monopolistic power and use it to suppress competition. Monopoly 
power is defined as the “power to control prices or exclude competition.”62 
The Court acknowledges that antitrust doctrine is not static but is “constantly 
evolving with new circumstances and wisdom.”63 Currently, the sheer 
amount of M&As in the technology space signifies an alarming rise in the 
level of concentration, and the disproportionate allocation of market power 
to a small number of companies.   
Robust M&A activity, in part, stems from VCs inducing startups to 
position themselves for an acquisition. The data demonstrates that venture 
capitalists are more incentivized to actualize their investment by selling 
rather than going public through IPO.64 More startups heavily rely on VC 
funding and venture capitalists look to M&A to generate growth and 
entrepreneurship. Additionally, VC funding plays a huge role in the 
 
 59. Rosalie Chan, A Startup’s VCs Were Pressuring the Company to Sell Itself So 
Employees Bought Out the VCs Instead. The CEO Explains Why He’s Done with Venture 
Investors, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 6, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/harmonie-ceo-
yaacov-cohen-explains-why-employees-bought-outs-its-vcs-2019-4. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. United States v. E. I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
 63. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 905 (2007). 
 64. GORDON M. PHILLIPS & ALEXEI ZHDANOV, VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS AND 
MERGER AND ACQUISITION ACTIVITY AROUND THE WORLD, 1, 1 (2018). 
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professionalization of startups.65 Empirical results demonstrate that while 
13.74% of exits are IPOs, mergers constituted 76.61% of exits.66 According 
to Prequin data on exits, M&A embody almost six times the incidence of 
IPO. The implications of this is that mergers are a viable and preferred exit 
strategy. The fact that M&A waves, not IPO waves predict VC behavior 
further illustrates the connection between VCs and M&A activity.67 
Merger policy is lenient regarding potential competition mergers. 
Historically, the FTC and DOJ primarily focused on mergers and 
acquisitions between established firms. However, this does not accurately 
reflect the current economic reality. In the technology market, the majority 
of acquisitions occur between a tech giant and an emerging small startup. At 
face value, these acquisitions do not appear anticompetitive because the 
relative market share is small.  On the contrary, these acquisitions harm the 
technology industry in the long term and lead to higher levels of 
concentration. The outcome is high barriers to entry, decreasing population 
of technology companies, diminishing innovation, and monopolistic tech 
companies yielding dominance over consumers. Preventative merger control 
policy fosters a fair environment for competition and entrepreneurship to 
flourish because it screens out the anticompetitive effects of these types of 
acquisitions. This is especially crucial because emerging startups play a 
critical role in spurring innovation, job creation, and productivity in the 
economy.68 The governing law for mergers is the Clayton Act as well as the 
Horizontal and Vertical Merger Guidelines.  
The underlying theme of the Clayton Act Sec. 7 and its subsequent 1950 
amendment is to combat the rising levels of concentration in American 
industries.69 To establish a violation under the Clayton Act, the effect of an 
acquisition of stock by one corporation of another may substantially lessen 
competition or create a monopoly.70 Also, mergers which result in a 
significant increase in concentration of firms in the market, and produce a 
company with undue share of the relevant market, is inherently disposed to 
substantially lessen competition.71 The Court reasoned that competition is 
 
 65. Id. at 5. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 18–19. 
 68. Ryan Decker, et al., The Role of Entrepreneurship in US Job Creation and Economic 
Dynamics, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (2014), http://econweb.umd.edu/~haltiwan/ 
jep_dhjm.pdf. 
 69. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-63 (1963). 
 70. Clayton Act, § 7, 15 U.S.C.A. § 18; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 
323 (1962). 
 71. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 362–63.  
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greatest when there are many sellers rather than a few who hold significant 
market share.72 For purposes of merger analysis, the primary inquiry is 
whether the proposed merger enhances market power or facilitates its 
exercise.73 There are two main types of mergers74: 1) vertical, between 
companies at different levels in the market75 2) horizontal, between direct 
competitors.76 Historically, the FTC and the DOJ have challenged horizontal 
mergers more vigorously than vertical mergers because the perceived risk to 
competition is more apparent. Additionally, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act 
authorizes antitrust agencies to review mergers and their effects prior to the 
completion of the merger.77 
The first problem with the current law is that it focuses on price-setting, 
which is an inadequate starting point for analysis in a world where services 
are often free. Google’s online search engines and Facebook’s social media 
are free for customers. Facebook became massive in the market because they 
provided services and products consumers needed. Thus, the threshold 
definition of market power and competition should be adjusted to account 
for such innovations in the product market. The FTC should have challenged 
Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp and Instagram in the same way that it 
blocked the merger of Franklin Electric and United Dominion.78 In the 
Franklin Electric and United Dominion case, both companies entered into a 
joint venture agreement.79 It resembled a near monopoly as both companies 
were the only two producers of submersible turbine pumps used for 
gasoline.80 The DOJ found that entry would be difficult by other competitors 
and that there would be no competition, thus it blocked the merger to prevent 
the formation of a monopoly and prohibit anticompetitive effects.81 
 
 72. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363.  
 73. US. Dep’t of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, (Aug. 
19, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf; 
horizontal merger guidelines 3.0.  
 74. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Guide to Antitrust Laws - Competitive Effects, https://www. 
ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/competitive-effects.   
 75. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972). 
 76. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334-35 (1962). 
 77. Fed Trade Comm’n, Guide to Antitrust Laws – Mergers, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers. 
 78. Fed Trade Comm’n, Commentary on Horizontal Merger Guidelines 26, (2006), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/mergers/commentaryonthehorizontalmer
gerguidelinesmarch2006.pdf. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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Similarly, Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp and Instagram created 
barriers to entry for other platform competitors. 
The second issue with merger review is that it does not sufficiently 
assess an acquisition’s potential risk profile. Due to these standards, many 
acquisitions fall through the cracks of the merger review process and results 
in tech companies blocking the formation and survival of new rival 
companies. Facebook’s acquisitions of startups have created a virtual 
monopoly leaving Facebook as the dominant company with high barriers to 
entry for other viable competitors. Particularly revealing is the way in which 
Facebook has utilized its acquisition of Instagram and WhatsApp to 
eliminate them from becoming potential competitors, kill Snapchat, and 
block Vine from its API. In allowing the merger to occur, the FTC has 
effectively lessened competition and potentially harmed consumers in the 
future. Since data functions as a currency of control in the tech market, the 
combined personal data of all three social application networks offers 
Facebook a steady stream of revenue from advertisers,82 and blocks newer 
social networks from forming. Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp and 
Instagram raises serious concerns about Facebook’s digital monopoly, 
anticompetitive effects, and the impact on consumer welfare especially in 
the area of digital security. Both WhatsApp and Instagram were vital 
competitors alongside Facebook in the social media and messaging services 
market. WhatsApp is a unique messaging service allowing people to stay 
connected without bombarding them with ads while providing end-to-end 
encryption security.83 Although the high-level platform integration from the 
combination of Instagram, WhatsApp and Facebook is convenient for users, 
ultimately it limits consumer choices and impacts the quality of the 
services.84 For example, the acquisition of WhatsApp threatened the unique 
quality of the end-to-end encryption messaging feature. The chief executive 
of WhatsApp, Jan Koum, resigned after the recent Cambridge Analytica 
scandal which further revealed the flaws in Facebook’s data collection 
services, as well as the weaknesses of their privacy and security policies. If 
WhatsApp and Instagram continued to compete independently Facebook in 
 
 82. John Shinal, How Mark Zuckerberg Has Used Instagram to Crush Evan Spiegel’s 
Snap, CNBC (July 12, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/12/how-mark-zuckerberg-has-
used-instagram-to-crush-evan-spiegels-snap.html. 
 83. Anthony Cuthbertson, Why Facebook Might Be About to Ruin WhatsApp, 
INDEPENDENT (May 1, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/featu 
res/facebook-whatsapp-change-privacy-encryption-messaging-app-jan-koum-a8330626.html. 
 84. Makena Kelly, Facebook’s Messaging Merger Leaves Lawmakers Questioning the 
Company’s Power, THE VERGE (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/28/18 
200658/facebook-messenger-instagram-whatsapp-google-congress-markey-blumenthal-scha 
tz-william-barr-doj-ftc. 
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the social/media messaging market, Facebook would have been compelled 
to innovate and increase the security and privacy quality of their services.85  
Furthermore, Facebook’s motivations for attempting to acquire 
Snapchat, and its response when its proposal got rejected indicates another 
reason why VCs induce their startups to sell. Snapchat entered in the social 
network space, attracting customers and businesses across the spectrum with 
millions of daily active users.86 Facebook recognized that Snapchat could 
pose a potential threat because it was continuing to attract users, and content 
usually posted on Facebook or Instagram, would be posted on Snapchat 
first.87 In order to quell this competition, they offered to purchase Snapchat 
for $3 billion in 2013.88 And when Snapchat rejected Facebook’s offer, 
Facebook copied and added a version of Snapchat’s Stories features on 
WhatsApp, Instagram and Facebook networks.89 Facebook also copied and 
built upon Snapchat’s face filters and disappearing messages features. It is 
important to note that while the Stories feature appeared in all three social 
networking apps, it was only really successful on Instagram. Facebook 
struggled to integrate the Stories Feature into their app and had to resort to 
giving Instagram users the ability to double-post on Instagram and 
Facebook.90 They even created Facebook Poke, an app intended to mirror 
Snapchat’s features and crush Snapchat.91 However, it failed.92 Without its 
acquisition of Instagram, Facebook would not have been able to stunt 
Snapchat’s growth and surpass Snapchat’s millions of daily active users. 
Thus, Facebook’s acquisition gave them the ability to gain dominance in the 
social network space, not by sheer efficiency but by copying all of 
Snapchat’s features and incorporating these features with its acquisition of 
Instagram. Facebook’s retaliatory actions contributed to Snapchat’s falling 
valuation. Many developing startups, like Snapchat, may not be willing to 
sell. However, although Snapchat survived Facebook’s copying tactics, most 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Billy Gallagher. How Facebook Tried to Squash Snapchat, WIRED (Feb. 16, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/copycat-how-facebook-tried-to-squash-snapchat/. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Gallagher, supra note 86. 
 90. Chris Welch, No One is Using Facebook Stories, So Facebook is Borrowing 
Instagram’s, THE VERGE (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/6/16264166/ 
facebook-stories-fail-instagram-please-help. 
 91. Seth Fiegerman, Snapchat CEO Reveals Why He Rejected Facebook’s $3 Billion 
Offer, MASHABLE (Jan. 6, 2014), https://mashable.com/2014/01/06/snapchat-facebook-acqui 
sition-2/#ANROAAMpWZqK. 
 92. Id. 
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startups may not have the scale, funding or time to respond to aggressive 
tactics. Because of this, when startups are approached for acquisition, VCs 
will be even more motivated to sell rather than undertake a risk that a tech 
giant will swoop in, copy the technology and significantly lower the value of 
the startup.  
The third problem is that lenient merger policies give rise to increased 
market concentration and consolidation which creates opportunities for tech 
giants to acquire a larger consumer base and veer closer to monopolization.93 
To illustrate, Amazon’s acquisition of Twitch, a video game streaming 
service, means that they can market to Twitch’s viewer base.94 Additionally, 
Amazon’s purchase of Whole Foods permits them to gain unique shopping 
data which Amazon can use to expand into the online grocery business.95 
Customer insights are the key to dominating a larger consumer base, 
attaining more economic influence and power. For this reason, Amazon can 
target ads and narrowly tailor shopping experiences more efficiently than 
typical companies in the grocery business.96 Namely, Amazon would be able 
to utilize the cross-platform data to target consumers with its own 
commercial products and sponsored products. This business expansion is not 
derived from natural development or growth, but from willful acquisition.  
Such a phenomenon is not limited to Amazon. Google’s search engine 
processes around three billion searches each day. Amazon has approximately 
197 million unique visitors a month while Facebook has roughly 2.32 billion 
active users each month.97 As tech giants consolidate and acquire smaller 
startups, they create a plethora of services from these deals to dominate the 
digital arena, driving these tech giants closer to near monopolization. This is 
evident in the way Facebook is cutting off access to its social networking 
platforms. Socials networks platforms are intended to be open, and increase 
connectivity by encouraging double-posting, finding contacts, and sharing 
various types of contents. Facebook blocked Vine’s access by preventing 
 
 93. Asher Schechter, Is There a Concentration Problem in America, STIGLER CTR., 
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO (May 2018), https://promarket.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Is-
There-a-Concentration-Problem-in-America.pdf. 
 94. Sandra Lee, Tech Companies are Consolidating like Crazy, UNIVERSITY OF SANTA 
BARBARA – THE BOTTOM LINE (Mar. 15, 2019), https://thebottomline.as.ucsb.edu/2019/03/ 
tech-companies-are-consolidating-like-crazy. 
 95. Lauren Hirsch, A Year after Amazon Announced Whole Foods Deal Here’s Where 
We Stand, CNBC (June 15, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/15/a-year-after-amazon-
announced-whole-foods-deal-heres-where-we-stand.html. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Lee, supra note 94. 
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Vine users from locating their Facebook Friends who use the Vine app.98 In 
doing so, Facebook makes it difficult for new social networking platforms to 
emerge.99 Not only will this function as a huge barrier to expand the user 
base, but startups working with this limitation will likely aim to get acquired 
since competition with dominant networks is not realistic.100 Additionally, 
even if startups created an innovative tool, it can be easily duplicated. VCs 
would be further motivated to position the startup for acquisition, and not 
IPO.  
 
Part 3.  Potential Remedy 
 
The FTC should take a more dynamic and forceful approach to merger 
review. By taking enforcement actions against mergers in the high-tech 
startup space, it will alter to some extent VC preference for mergers as a 
viable exit strategy. The FTC’s merger review policy has no bite as indicated 
by data demonstrating that between 1996 and 2012, the FTC did not 
challenge mergers that resulted in five or more remaining firms.101 Antitrust 
laws were designed to stop network monopolies.102 The tech giants of today 
are monopolizing the digital tech space through vertical integration and 
swallowing up startups before they can lay a claim to the digital tech market. 
Thus, the FTC and the DOJ should step in and strengthen their enforcement 
actions against mergers as it has done so before.  
First, the FTC should place more emphasis on enforcing guidelines 
more strongly in order to prevent potentially anticompetitive mergers from 
happening. As an illustration, AT&T forfeited its proposed acquisition of T-
Mobile when the DOJ filed an antitrust suit in an attempt to block the 
merger.103 Here, enhanced merger enforcement not only compelled a change 
in AT&T’s behavior, but improved competition in the long term for wireless 
 
 98. Molly McHugh, How Social Networks Are Ruining Social Networks, DIGITAL 
TRENDS (Jan. 25, 2013), https://www.digitaltrends.com/opinion/facebook-cuts-off-access-to-
vine/. 
 99. Isobel Asher Hamilton, Emails Show Mark Zuckerberg Personally Approved 
Facebook’s Decision to Cut Off Vine’s Access to Data, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 5, 2018, 8:53 
AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-documents-mark-zuckerberg-restricted-vin 
e-data-access-2018-12. 
 100. McHugh, supra note 98. 
 101. Asher Schechter, Is There A Concentration Problem in America?, (Guy Rolnik 
2018); supra note 95. 
 102. Id. at 10. 
 103. Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power, Council of Economic 
Advisers Issue Brief (Apr. 14, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/ 
files/page/files/20160414_cea_competition_issue_brief.pdf. 
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carrier services. The DOJ argued that the merger was harmful to consumer 
welfare because it would reduce competition in the mobile carrier’s sector, 
decrease innovation, and result in higher prices with poorer quality 
services.104 Both AT&T and T-Mobile competed nationally and locally as  
T-Mobile had positioned itself as a disruptor in the market, offering high 
quality, low price accessible smartphones to the average American 
consumer. The merger would eliminate T-Mobile as a competitor and 
significantly reduce competition.105 Thus, any efficiency arising from the 
merging parties’ proposal did not offset the considerable adverse effects on 
consumers and competition in the industry.106 Had the merger proposal 
succeeded, smaller providers would not be able to survive or enter into the 
market because of the combined network power of AT&T and T-Mobile. 
Furthermore, the mobile carrier services industry would suffer from a lack 
of innovation and a suite of versatile mobile services that T-Mobile had 
achieved. Namely, T-Mobile introduced the first Android phone, Blackberry 
email and Sidekick.107 The merger would eliminate T-Mobile’s lower priced 
data and voice plans. It otherwise would not have incentivized big market 
players like AT&T, Verizon, or Sprint to continue to innovate and transform 
mobile services as they have done today.108 Without the merger, T-Mobile 
could not have partnered with MetroPCS or challenged Sprint’s Family plans 
with their own modified family plans. 109 The DOJ’s strong stance against 
this particular acquisition served to promote competition and the continued 
innovation of mobile contracts and services.  
CDK Global Inc.’s (“CDK”) proposed acquisition of Auto/Mate is 
another merger that the FTC took action against, causing CDK to abandon 
the merger. Both parties in the merger are competitors functioning as 
 
 104. Justice Department Files Antitrust Lawsuit to Block AT&T’s Acquisition of T-
Mobile, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 31, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-depart 
ment-files-antitrust-lawsuit-block-att-s-acquisition-t-mobile. 
 105. U.S. v. AT&T Inc., T-Mobile USA, Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG, U.S. D. OF 
COLUM., https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/487776/download. 
 106. Justice Department Files Antitrust Lawsuit to Block AT&T’s Acquisition of T-
Mobile, supra note 104. 
 107. U.S. v. AT&T Inc., T-Mobile USA, Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG, supra note 105. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Mark Rogowsky, There’s Be No Wireless Wars Without the Blocked T-Mobile 
Merger, So Where Does That Leave Comcast-TWC?, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2014, 7:52 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/markrogowsky/2014/08/27/t-mobile-and-sprint-continue-to-ba 
ttle-thanks-to-the-government/#511efa563160. 
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franchise dealer management systems providers.110 Their business software 
is used by vehicle dealerships for all aspects of business operations ranging 
from HR, inventory to scheduling and accounting.111 CDK was one of two 
largest competitors in the market. On the other hand, Auto/Mate was a 
disruptor in the market through aggressive pricing and by offering 
customized software updates. Auto/Mate was becoming a lethal competitor 
to CDK, thus CDK sought to acquire it at a price excessively higher than 
Auto/Mate’s valuation.112 The consummation of the merger would result in 
reduced competition through high concentration an dominance of the dealer 
management services franchise product market, stifled innovation and lower 
quality services.113 The FTC recognized the harm it could bring to the market 
and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the parties from completing 
the merger.114 Shortly after, CDK withdrew its merger proposal.115 
Competition and innovation was preserved in the market. Here, the FTC saw 
that even though Auto/Mate itself had a comparatively small market share, 
it had the potential to gain a significant share of the market. The FTC’s action 
demonstrates that they possess the power to change the economic behavior 
of firms seeking to acquire potential competitors. Additionally, it illustrates 
that the FTC can be successful in high tech cases even where there is no 
clear-cut high market share of one party in the merger.  
Second, the FTC and DOJ should analyze potential mergers in light of 
their impact on innovation.116 For the tech market, price as a metric of 
anticompetitive behavior is insufficient because tech companies often offer 
their services for free. Additionally, the benefit of an acquisition does not 
rest upon the ability to raise or lower prices, but the ability to gain access to 
technology and consumer data. However, a difficulty with innovation effects 
is that it may be hard to identify the true competitors at the time of the 
transaction. For example, when Facebook first proposed to merge with 
 
 110. In the Matter of CDK Global, Inc., et al., Docket No. 9382, Order Dismissing 
Complaint, (Mar. 26, 2018) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/docket_no_ 
9382_cdk_automate_part_3_complaint_redacted_public_version_0.pdf. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. FTC Challenges CDK Global, Inc.’s Proposed Acquisition of Competitor Auto/Mate, 
Inc., Federal Trade Commission (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2018/03/ftc-challenges-cdk-global-incs-proposed-acquisition-competitor. 
 115. Id. 
 116. John Kwoka, Reviving Merger Control A Comprehensive Plan for Reforming Policy 
and Practice, (Oct. 9, 2018), at 37, available at https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/Kwoka-Reviving-Merger-Control-October-2018.pdf. 
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WhatsApp and Instagram, federal regulators could not determine if there 
would be anticompetitive effects because the products were not perceived to 
be actual substitutes. To mitigate such uncertainties with identifying harmful 
mergers, regulators should take into account how technology products fit 
with each other, and the position of startups in the tech market. A startup’s 
role in the tech market is to be a disruptor to the benefit of the customer. If a 
startup gets acquired, it is essentially eliminated from competing against 
incumbent tech firms. This leads to stagnation of innovation because startups 
will not have the opportunity to innovate new technology, create business 
models or push other companies to innovate.117 With VCs positioning 
startups for acquisition, startups may not be able to fulfil their roles in 
generating more competition and innovation. VCs prefer the M&A exit 
strategy because M&As are rarely challenged. Antitrust regulation focusing 
on innovation effects challenges more tech acquisitions, which could 




Antitrust protects competition, not competitors.118 Not all mergers are 
the enemy of competition. For example, a merger between two small startups 
to enable them to compete effectively against dominant players is valid.119 
Similarly, a merger between a financially stable company and company 
which is failing, does not impede competition.120 However, a merger which 
tends to substantially lessen competition will adversely affect competition. 
Such mergers are becoming more prevalent in the startup ecosystem as a 
preferred exit strategy due to VC pressures. VCs are driven by their fiduciary 
duties to realize the investment within the investment period. Often, this brief 
period is not adequate enough for startups to scale sustainably and build a 
quality product. During each stage of VC financing, VCs gain significant 
ownership and power over startup operations and corporate governance. VCs 
push for growth as a measure of success, thereby causing rapid low-quality 
growth that sacrifices legal compliance. As the investment period draws 
near, VCs pressure startups to sell rather than continuing to support them 
financially or encouraging them to do the IPO route. The pressure to sell is 
further enhanced by poor corporate governance policies which make it 
 
 117. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 19, 2010), https:// 
www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010#2f. 
 118. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319-20 (1962). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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extremely costly to be compliant by public firm standards. Furthermore, VCs 
fear falling valuations stemming from the tech giants potentially duplicating 
the startup’s idea or from a fear that the startup will no longer be a hot topic, 
and thus their goal is to prematurely sell at the highest valuation they can. 
This prevents startups from becoming vital competitors as disruptors in the 
tech market and gives tech giants leverage to acquire the companies to 
maintain their dominance.  
In order to incentivize investors from relying heavily upon the M&A 
exit strategy, there needs to be more forceful merger control policy. 
Although the FTC and DOJ do not always prevail in blocking an acquisition, 
the mere fact that take enforcement action has been enough to compel 
companies to abandon the merger or draw scrutiny to industry practices is a 
positive development. For instance, the DOJ filed a lawsuit to block AT&T’s 
proposed acquisition of Time Warner for $85 billion.121 Ultimately, this 
effort did not prevail, but it did send a message to tech companies that the 
government is able to hold companies accountable and is willing to apply the 
same force to tech giants who are acquiring emerging promising startups.122 
To effectively fortify the position of antitrust enforcement actions, the 
agencies and courts should incorporate the following substantive 
approaches: 1) focus more heavily on market impacts of innovation, 
potential competition, and barriers to entry 2) bring more antitrust actions 
against technology companies as a deterrence measure and 3) adopt a 
cautious approach to approving mergers. The combination of these 
approaches permits the DOJ and FTC to block anticompetitive mergers, 
thereby cultivating a precedent for stricter scrutiny of acquisitions. 
Essentially, it will be more difficult for mergers to pass DOJ and FTC 
standards. VCs and M&A waves correspond with each other and these 
remedies may alter to an extent, VC behavior towards startups, encouraging 
them to consider other exit strategies or longer-term investments. 
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